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Abstract 
From the perspective of financial system engineering, financial robustness refers to the ability of financial system that copes with 
change. Frequently, those factors which lead to changes result in the instability of systematic robustness. In this paper, a 
quantitative research is conducted to disclose the robustness of debt financing system and its strategy. Based on the goal of 
business value maximization combined with some key stochastic constraints of financial early warning as well as Z-score model, 
a linear programming analytical model (acronymed as MRDF) is established. Moreover, the numeric solution of the model is 
figured out by Lingo Software. It is concluded that, the MRDF framework can help both loaner and debtor businesses to properly 
formulate their debt financing strategy to realize their business value maximization and prevent financial risks. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.  
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1. Introduction 
According to the theory of complexity, one of the most important contents of system engineering, robustness 
refers to the tolerance of failure and attack, or flexibility of a system. Correspondingly, for a financial system, 
robustness can be employed to describe its tolerance or stableness facing financial uncertainty and risk. In the 
process of business operation, many negative factors exist and the financial robustness forces the business to change. 
With the development of the market economy, debt financing has been more and more acceptable by stakeholders. 
Once the loan is determined, the company should decide how to design the plan of repayment to reach the goal of 
business value maximization and ensure the stability of finance. Actually, most companies are particularly attentive 
to the size or amount of financing as well as the way of repayment, but ignore the corresponding financial 
robustness, which has created many serious problems. Thus it is extremely important to consider how to guarantee 
the financial position of business in an effective way. For banking service businesses, one of their main purposes is 
to guard against financial risk, but frequently they only evaluate some financial indicators roughly before loaning, 
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and decide to make loan or not based on historical data or even experiences; there is not an effective and timely 
method to control the risk of corporate repayment in each cycle. In order to solve this problem, enlightened by the 
theory of system engineering and cybernetics, we could introduce the analytical tools referred to robustness into the 
financial engineering system. Therefore, in this paper, employing the concept and theory of robustness, the target 
function of maximizing the business’s value is proposed under the constraints of certain financial conditions, which 
is named as the model of robustness of debt financing (MRDF) by us and is expected to be employed to control the 
financial robustness in the practice of debt financing. 
2. Literature review 
How to assess the value of the company and the debtor's credit risk more accurately are two of the most 
important issues in recent study on debt financing. Lending decision is mainly made based on the appraisals of 
company's value and financial risk. The work of business value assessment can be traced back to Modigliani and 
Miller (1958, 1963), they scrutinized the relationship between capital structure and the value of company, and then 
established the MM model for business evaluation [1], [2]. The relationship between risk and return was firstly 
revealed by Markowitz (capital asset pricing model, 1952)[3], his CAPM cleared the obstacle of the discounted cash 
flow method and became the mainstream method of business valuation, while the most recent researches in this field 
are manifold and very empirical (see literature[4],[5],[6], [7],[8],[9],[10], etc.). In 1968, Altman proposed the Z-
score model to evaluate the financial position (robustness), which has been a fundamental method for early financial 
warning [11]. Brian & Thanasis (2005) argued that the financial robustness could be eroded by various negative 
factors through reducing the level of its critical point, and might be the last straw to trigger business’s financial crisis 
[12]. From an empirical perspective, Anderson, et al.(2003), examined changes in board size and board 
independence, and found that, as they increase, debt yields significantly decrease[13]. Again, they (2003) 
investigated the impact of family ownership on the agency cost of debt, and found that family firms have incentive 
structures that result in fewer agency conflicts between equity and debt claimants; bond holders view founding 
family ownership as an organizational structure that better protects their interests [14]. Ağca & Mansi (2007) 
examined the impact of agency conflicts on firms’ debt financing decisions, and found that a two-dimensional 
aspect of governance that includes the interaction between managerial ownership and takeover defenses is useful in 
understanding the impact of agency conflicts on firms’ debt financing decisions [15]. To reflect the strengths and 
weaknesses of different market orientated strategies during the global financial crisis, Lawson & Gilmour (2010) 
brought about a preliminary evaluation on the robustness of approaches for channelling financial resources towards 
affordable rental housing in England, France, Netherland, Austria and Switzerland[16]. Paligorova & Yang (2011) 
argued that lower takeover defenses increase the cost of debt only in competitive industries. Bondholders in 
competitive industries charge higher cost of debt mainly because of their concern about takeovers, while in non-
competitive industries they charge more firms with high takeover defense because of their concern about agency 
cost-driven default [17]. Mauer & Triantis (1994) argued that higher production flexibility enhances the firm's debt 
capacity, thereby increasing the net tax shield value of debt financing, as well the impact of debt financing on the 
firm's investment and operating decisions is economically insignificant[18].Liao(2008) investigated how dedicated 
investors affect agency costs of debt and firms’ debt financing decisions. He found that interest rates in both bank 
loans and corporate bonds increase with dedicated ownership, and firms with more dedicated ownership tend to 
choose bank loans over corporate bonds in order to obtain lower debt costs [19]. From the perspective of the 
relationship between Leasing and debt financing, Yan (2006) conducted an investigation to test it and found that 
leasing and debt financing are substitutes instead of complements, namely, the cost of new debt increases to a higher 
degree with an extra lease [20]. Lima & de Freitas (2007) developed an agent-based computational bottom-up model 
of output production, in which the endogenous credit-money supplied by an adaptive banking system and the cash 
flow of heterogeneous firms are modeled as co-evolutionary phenomena. As it turns out, financial fragility becomes 
an emergent dynamics in such a complex economy with the distribution of financing regimes [21]. Almeida & 
Campello (2008) discovered that the negative effect of internal funds on the demand for external financing is 
concentrated on firms that are least likely to face high external financing costs, and the greater complementarity 
between internal funds and external finance for constrained firms is a consequence of the interdependence of their 
financing and investment decisions [22]. Egger, et al. (2009) compared domestic and foreign-owned plants with 
respect to their debt-to-assets ratio, and analyzed how the difference is systematically affected by corporate taxation. 
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They found that foreign-owned firms on average exhibit a significantly higher debt ratio than their domestically-
owned counterparts in the host country [23].  
After reviewing corresponding literatures, it’s not difficult to find that, so far most researches in this field have 
been focused on the evaluation of business value, the relationship between risk and return, and some specific issues 
of debt financing. However, we can hardly ever find the literatures referred to the robustness of debt financing and 
its strategy. Thus it’s really dangerous for both investors and debtors because they can’t learn whether they should 
offer or ask for a loan or not. From the aspect of a firm, it can not formulate an appropriate debt financing strategy 
or implement the strategy without a scientific analysis on robustness of debt financing. Therefore, we attempt to 
make contributions in this field.     
3. Hypotheses and model 
As it is known, the value of a company could be regarded as sum of the discounted value of annual profit after 
interest and tax, and Z-score model is employed to identify the financial robustness, with which the cost of 
information due to information asymmetry between loaners and debtors can be reduced and a reasonable plan of 
repayment can be obtained. 
In order to simplify the model, we assume that a business (debtor) finances only through debt financing. From the 
perspective of a business, its goal is to maximize its value which can be expressed by sum of discounted cash flow 
of equity and debt. In this model, the tax and dividend distribution are taken into consideration, and the depreciation 
of fixed assets is figured out according to its estimated residual value and tenure of use. Supposing V is the total 
value of a business, VE is the value of equity, VD is the value of the claims, is the profit before interest and 
tax, is the interest which would be repaid in year, T is the tax rate, 
tEBIT
tht η is the rate of profit distribution, is 
the amount of depreciation, RT is the principal which would be repaid in the  year, is the cost rate of equity 
capital,  is the cost rate of debt , then, the firm’s value can be expressed as following expression (1) and (2): 
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Financial viability refers to the lowest requirement of a company, namely, net present value should be more than 
zero. According to these, suppose the probability that a company's value is greater than its total investment is more 
than 1ϕ  under a certain confidence level. So chance constraints can be defined as: 
 
)10(,)0( 11 ，∈≥>− ϕϕITVP                                                           (3) 
 
In this paper, a z-score model is employed to measure and maintain the financial robustness in a business. The 
value of critical point in this model is 10. If the model’s value is less than zero, it indicates that there is a serious 
financial crisis; in case the value is greater than 10, it demonstrates that the financial status is perfect; again if it 
locates between 0 and 10, it’s indeterminate to judge. So the minimum Z-score value which can be acceptable for a 
healthy debt financing system is 10. Here,  Z stands for the value of the z-score model; TI represents the total invests 
before financing; 1α refers to the growth rate of total sales; 2α means the growth rate of  total assets; 3α is defined 
as the current ratio; 4α  is the productivity(crude value-added). Therefore, referring to literature [4], we can depict 
the Z-score constraint as expression (4): 
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Taking the constraints of the bank's default rate into consideration, the indicators including debt coverage ratio, 
interest coverage ratio and debt sustainability are selected to assess the ability of companies’ repayment.  
(1) The debt coverage ratio is used to measure the company’s cash flow ability of repayment (suppose all cash 
flows are pre-tax one). Under a certain confidence level, the following constraints (expression (5)-(6)) must be met 
(here, t1α is a given confidence level).  
])1/(/[)( tttt ITRTADEBITDCR +−+=                                            (5) 
)1,0(,))1/(( 11 ∈≥+−>+ ttttt ITRTADEBITP αα                                  (6) 
 
(2)Interest coverage ratio refers to the capacity to repay debt in pre-tax profits. If the level of confidence is 
denoted as t2α , then we have (expression (7)-(8)): 
ITEBITICR tt /=                                                                  (7) 
)10(,)0( 22 ，∈≥≥− tttt IEBITP αα                                           (8) 
(3)Debt sustainability means a company's value is greater than its liabilities. Under a certain confidence 
level( t3α ), the following expressions (expression (9)-(10)) should be met. 
DVCR /=                                                                          (9) 
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Based on the above objective function and constraints, we can obtain the following linear programming model 
(expression (13)-(15)) ： 
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Estimated parameters involved in the Model are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1. Parameters of the linear programming model 
parameter name Value parameter name value 
n  Loan repayment period 10 TI  Total assets before financing 1000 
T Tax rate 33% D Loans 600 
er  The cost rate of equity capital 10% dr  Cost rate of debt 7% 
d Asset-liability ratio 60% 1α  Growth rate of sales  20% 
2α  Growth rate of total assets  30% 3α  Current Ratio 1.5 
4α  Productivity(crude value-added) 60% 1ϕ  Confidence level 1 0.9 
t1α
t3α
 Confidence level 2 0.9 t2α  Confidence level 3 0.9 
 Confidence level 4 0.9 η  distribution rate of Profit  20% 
AD The amount of depreciation 
 of fixed assets        
100    
In this paper, it is assumed that the future value of EBIT obeys mean reverting process. Actually, in practice, the 
approach for an asset to create gain is either definite or random. For instance, usually, bonds and bank deposits can 
bring about fixed and definite gains; while for most other financial or physical assets, their gains are very random as 
well as unpredictable since they are strongly affected by various uncertainties, thus we argue that they could be 
depicted as a stochastic process. Here, we could simulate the value of EBIT with normal distribution, and the results 
are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Forecasting of EBIT 
3EBIT  4EBIT  5EBIT  6EBIT  7EBIT  8EBIT  9IT1IT 2EB  EBIT   EB  10EBIT  
Mean 113.4 118.5 123.8 129.4 135.3 141.5 147.9 154.8 161.9 169.5 
4. Analysis and discussion 
The model can be figured out by LINGO software, the main program is listed as following: 
max=@sum(year(i):(I(i)+RT(i))*((1/1.07^i)-1/(1.1^i))+T*I(i)/((1+r1)^i)); 
@for(year(i)|i#ge#m+1:RT(i)=0); 
@sum(year(i):RT)<=d*I; 
@for(year(i):I (i)=k1@sum(year(j)|j#ge#i:RT(j))); 
@for(year(i):(RT(i)/(1-T)+I(i))-AP<=ut(i)+a*vt(i)); 
177Yonghong Zhan and Xian Zeng / Systems Engineering Procedia 3 (2012) 172 – 178Yonghong Zhan & Xian Zeng/ Systems Engineering Procedia  00 (2012) 000–000 
@for(year(i):I(i)<=ut(i)+b*vt(i)); 
E=@sum(year(i):ut(i)／(1+r1)^(i+1)); 
v=@sum(year(i):vt(i)^2／(1+r1)^(2+{i+1))); 
(1/(1-T))*(I+@sum(year(i):(I(i)*(1-T)-AD+RT(i))/(1+r1)^i-(I(i)+RT(i))/(1+k1)^i))<E+c*v; 
(1/(1-T))*(@sum(year(i):RT(i))+@sum(year(i):(I(i)*(1-T)-AD+RT(i))/(1+r1)^i-(I(i)+RT(i))/(1+k1)^i))<E+c*v; 
After the above process of simulating, we can obtain the expected value of the objective function (1328.5) as 
well as the optimum repayment plan (shown in Table 3). 
Table 3. Expected repayment plan 
 first year second year third year forth year fifth year sixth year seventh year Total 
Principal 0 0 74.92 105.99 133.23 138.15 147.71 600 
Interest 40.5 40.5 40.5 35.27 30.49 21.05 10.9 219.21 
Based on the above estimations, providing that the company's total investment is 1000 monetary units, and the 
debt ratio is 70%, we can find that the debtor company repays no principal but only interest in the first two years. It 
looks very reasonable, because the company’s funding is in shortage and cash flow is relatively small at the 
beginning of debt financing, so the loan can’t be repaid in order to maintain the financial stability. When the cash 
flow generated by the company is growing well, then the principal could be repaid gradually according to the 
corresponding amount of cash flow generated. Definitely, this strategy is conducive to achieving the goal of 
business value maximization. 
From the model, we can also find, when total demand of fund is definite, with the scale of loans increasing, the 
return of the business’s equity capital and the business’s value will rise as well. Meanwhile, the risk of business will 
increase and the possibility of involuntary bankruptcy caused by stoppage of cash flow will be enhanced. For 
banking service businesses, their return would increase with the scale of loans rising, but the possibility of suffering 
lose also increases. So it is necessary for banking service businesses to establish effective mechanism to prevent risk, 
and adopt the exact risk management technique to reduce the probability of defaulting of debtors.  
5. Conclusions 
The MRDF model is an improvement of the ordinary financing engineering model. Combining with the goal of 
business value maximization and the stochastic constraints based on the interest coverage ratio, debt coverage, debt 
affordability as well as Z-score, a linear programming is brought about to figure out the robustness of the debt 
financing system and its strategy. Using the MRDF model, a business (debtor) can properly formulate the plan of 
loan repayment during the period of debt financing; while for a loaner (esp. banking service company) can guard 
against the risk of default as far as possible. Anyway, the methodology proposed in this paper might be meaningful 
for loaner as well as debtor businesses to prevent financial crisis during their holistic financial cycle to maintain a 
secure and healthy financial status of the economy.  
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